Summary. The paper studies the class SC ^' of cooperative games with player set N which have the semiconvexity property. SC u is decomposed into an algebraic sum of convex cones of games for which generating sets are available. The union of these sets thus forms a generating set for SC ~. Special attention is paid to one of the considered cones in the decomposition ofSC u. In particular, the so called airport savings games we,y e NN, defined by wy(S) = ~j~s Yj-maxj~s yj for 0 e S CN, are emphasized.
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Submodular cost and supermodular savings functions
As an application of game theoretic analysis to the cost allocation problem, Littlechild and Owen (1973) studied the problem of setting airport landing charges for different types of aircraft. Their game theoretic approach to the * This work is part of the Ph.D. thesis of the first author (Derks 1991) airport cost allocation problem is based on an appropriately defined set function, the so-called airport cost function cy : 2 N--* N. Here N is the set of planes which are to land at the airport and y = (Yi)i~u denotes the costs for the planes i~N to construct a runway of appropriate length. Then the costs cy(S) of a subset S of planes is determined by that plane in S with the longest runway, i.e.~ cyta)_ _ = max Yi. It can easily be verified that the savings function wy of (2) induced by an airport cost function and, thus, it satisfies the supermodularity conditions (1). In the game theoretic context, the term convexity is preferred to the term supermodularity. This paper focuses 134 J.J.M. Derks and T. S. H. Driessen: Semiconvex games on a related condition, the semiconvexity, which is a weaker condition than the convexity.
In Sect. 2 the notion of semiconvexity for a cooperative game is described. Section 3 is devoted to a decomposition of the class of semiconvex games into an algebraic sum of three convex cones of games. The decomposition is strongly based on the smallest convex cone of games containing the savings games of (2). Subsequently, a generating set for SC 'v is presented. SC u does not have extreme directions according to the fact that the IN[-dimensional linear subspace of additive games is contained in SC u. In Sect. 4 it is shown that the cone scrV of 0 -normalized semiconvex games is generated by 0-normalized games in the generating set of SC u as presented in Sect. 3. Furthermore, we will show that these games are actually extreme directions of SC6 v.
The class of semiconvex games
First let us briefly go into the game theoretic setting. We consider a cooperative game in characteristic function form, or simply a game, with finite player set Nto be a real- 
y(S)>v(S) for all SEN.
Throughout the paper we pay special attention to the marginal contribution allocation of a game. Given One of the main topics of research in cooperative game theory is how to allocate the value v(N) in a game v e G u among the players. Since the introduction of the notion of a cooperative game, many solution concepts for these games have been proposed to solve the relevant allocation problem. Generally speaking, the concepts provide satisfactory and stable solutions only on a specific subclass of the game space. Perhaps the best-known solution concept is the so-called core: an allocation ye R 'v is said to be a core allocation of a game v e G u if y distributes the value v(N) among the players in such a way thaty majorizes v. In other words, the core C(v) of a game v e G u consists of all allocations y eR N satisfying y(N) = v(N) and y > v. Obviously, there are games without core allocations.
The solution part of cooperative game theory is mainly based on the traditional assumption that the grand coalition N will be formed. Note that the marginal contribution allocation b ~ of a game v is derived from the marginal contributions of each player with respect to the formation of the grand coalition. We assert that a player i Semiconvex games are introduced in Driessen and Tijs (1985) as an adjunct to the study of the z-value concept.
There it is established that SC ~v is a (2 lul_ 1)-dimensional cone in G u which includes the class of convex games (i.e. games satisfying the supermodularity conditions (1) 
